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Abstract:	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠin	 ﾠSocratic	 ﾠscholarship	 ﾠhas	 ﾠit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠPlato’s	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠintellectualist	 ﾠabout	 ﾠmotivation,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠaccepts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠboth	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠactions	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠalways	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠconcurrent	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠ
overall	 ﾠbest	 ﾠinterest.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠan	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠintellectualist	 ﾠ
interpretation	 ﾠof	 ﾠSocrates,	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠaccepts	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount’s	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠactions	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrejects	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesires.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠ
view,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠalways	 ﾠresponsive	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠaccount,	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠ
interpretations	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠpassages:	 ﾠ	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠ77b6-ﾭ‐78c2	 ﾠand	 ﾠProtagoras	 ﾠ352b1-ﾭ‐
358d4.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠ77b6-ﾭ‐78c2,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠargument	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠmake	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ
using	 ﾠProtagoras	 ﾠ352b1-ﾭ‐358d4	 ﾠfails.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠSocratic	 ﾠMoral	 ﾠPsychology,	 ﾠThomas	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠNicholas	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠmake	 ﾠ
Socrates1	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠintellectualist	 ﾠabout	 ﾠmotivation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠintellectualist	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
motivation	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠactions	 ﾠalways	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
one’s	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠbest	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect,	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Smith	 ﾠare	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠfairly	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠin	 ﾠSocratic	 ﾠscholarship.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ
Brickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠemphatically	 ﾠreject	 ﾠanother	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Socrates,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠholds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠactions	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠalways	 ﾠ
follow	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠbest	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOr	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠa	 ﾠbit	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcautious	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠpicture,	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠholds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠbest	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠof	 ﾠPlato’s	 ﾠso-ﾭ‐called	 ﾠSocratic	 ﾠdialogues:	 ﾠ	 ﾠroughly,	 ﾠApology,	 ﾠCharmides,	 ﾠCrito,	 ﾠ
Euthydemus,	 ﾠEuthyphro,	 ﾠGorgias,	 ﾠHippias	 ﾠMajor,	 ﾠHippias	 ﾠMinor,	 ﾠIon,	 ﾠLaches,	 ﾠLysis,	 ﾠProtagoras,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Republic	 ﾠI	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠ18,	 ﾠ30-ﾭ‐37).	 ﾠ	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfreely	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠMeno,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠtake	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpiece	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSocratic	 ﾠdialogues	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠ
psychology	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠ8).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcontroversy	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
interpreting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠdialogues	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠviable	 ﾠor	 ﾠfruitful	 ﾠproject.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠdevote	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠ1	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbook	 ﾠto	 ﾠarguing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproject	 ﾠis	 ﾠviable	 ﾠand	 ﾠstill	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠfruit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ
interest	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠthat	 ﾠserve	 ﾠas	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠof	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠactions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠrational	 ﾠdesires,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠthose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagent’s	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠher	 ﾠbest	 ﾠinterest,	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactions	 ﾠshe	 ﾠperforms.2	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠreject.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠaccount,	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠthinks	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠ
overall	 ﾠbest	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfact	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
motivational	 ﾠfeature.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠcomponent	 ﾠof	 ﾠmotivation.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Brickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠtracks	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠby	 ﾠusing	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠterms	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcognates)	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠdesires:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ‘boulêsis’	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrational	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘epithumia’	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠdesire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthem	 ﾠis	 ﾠCharmides	 ﾠ167e1-ﾭ‐53:	 ﾠ
Socrates:	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠany	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ(epithumia)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠpleasure	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfor	 ﾠitself	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠdesires?	 ﾠ
Critias:	 ﾠ	 ﾠCertainly	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ
Socrates:	 ﾠ	 ﾠNor	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠany	 ﾠwish	 ﾠ(boulêsis),	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwishes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠno	 ﾠgood	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠfor	 ﾠitself	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠwishes.4	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
2	 ﾠTwo	 ﾠproponents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠview	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠwork	 ﾠserves	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfoil	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith’s	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠare	 ﾠTerry	 ﾠPenner	 ﾠand	 ﾠNaomi	 ﾠReshotko.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSee,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠPenner	 ﾠ(1991),	 ﾠPenner	 ﾠ(1992),	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Reshotko	 ﾠ(2006).	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠThroughout,	 ﾠI	 ﾠuse	 ﾠtranslations	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠCooper	 ﾠ(1997)	 ﾠunless	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠnoted.	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠSee	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ51,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠmark	 ﾠthis	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠpassage.	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnfortunately,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
spend	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠspace	 ﾠanalyzing	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠanalysis,	 ﾠone	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ
concerns	 ﾠabout	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpassage.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠ
means	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠepithumia	 ﾠand	 ﾠboulêsis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠare	 ﾠmere	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠcast	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠK,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠas	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
objects	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthat	 ﾠother	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠK	 ﾠtake	 ﾠas	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠobjects,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠitself	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
members	 ﾠof	 ﾠK	 ﾠas	 ﾠits	 ﾠobjects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠwe	 ﾠget	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexample	 ﾠof	 ﾠopinions	 ﾠ(doxai),	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠbother	 ﾠto	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproper	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠof	 ﾠopinions,	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠonly,	 ﾠ“Or	 ﾠ[have	 ﾠyou	 ﾠobserved]	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
opinion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠitself	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠopinions	 ﾠbut	 ﾠopines	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠother	 ﾠopinions	 ﾠdo?”	 ﾠ(168a3-ﾭ‐4)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠmight	 ﾠlead	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠis	 ﾠquite	 ﾠunconcerned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠspecifying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproper	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
his	 ﾠexample	 ﾠkinds,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠused	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice	 ﾠof	 ﾠcasting	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
possibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠCritias’	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠtemperance	 ﾠas	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠitself	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠknowledges	 ﾠfull	 ﾠstop.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Second	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠas	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠnote	 ﾠon	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ51),	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠhis	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
epithumia	 ﾠand	 ﾠboulêsis,	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠuses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexample	 ﾠof	 ﾠerôs:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“And	 ﾠwould	 ﾠyou	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠlove	 ﾠ
(erôs)	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠsort	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠlove	 ﾠof	 ﾠno	 ﾠfine	 ﾠthing	 ﾠ(kalou)	 ﾠbut	 ﾠof	 ﾠitself	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠloves?”	 ﾠ(167e7-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Since	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠhere	 ﾠassigns	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠpleasant	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgood,	 ﾠ
respectively)	 ﾠto	 ﾠepithumia	 ﾠand	 ﾠboulêsis,	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
indicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠhas	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠconceptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠaccount,	 ﾠ
nonrational	 ﾠdesires,	 ﾠepithumiai,	 ﾠmay	 ﾠremain	 ﾠactive	 ﾠand	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠaction	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠagent	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠconcurrent	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐things-ﾭ‐considered	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠ
best	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobject	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠdesire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠ
intellectualist,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠcan	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠaction	 ﾠonly	 ﾠindirectly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Action	 ﾠalways	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐things-ﾭ‐considered	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠbest	 ﾠ
interest,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠmay	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠaction	 ﾠonly	 ﾠby	 ﾠinfluencing	 ﾠbelief.5	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ But	 ﾠenough	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠaccount.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAside	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpassages,	 ﾠ
Brickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠrely	 ﾠcentrally	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinterpretations	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpassages	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠinterpretation,	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠ77b6-ﾭ‐
78c2	 ﾠand	 ﾠProtagoras	 ﾠ352b1-ﾭ‐358d4,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpassages	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠ
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8)	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdistinctions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpassage,	 ﾠit	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠerôs	 ﾠ
stands	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠthird	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠthird	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠobject,	 ﾠalongside	 ﾠepithumia	 ﾠand	 ﾠboulêsis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠwell	 ﾠwonder	 ﾠhow	 ﾠerôs	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠinto	 ﾠSocrates’	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠpsychology.	 ﾠ	 ﾠJudging	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
book,	 ﾠerôs	 ﾠis	 ﾠhardly	 ﾠworth	 ﾠmentioning	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠSocratic	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠpsychology.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
reference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindex	 ﾠto	 ﾠeither	 ﾠ‘love’	 ﾠor	 ﾠ‘erôs’	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ51.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPerhaps	 ﾠerôs	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfear,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
next	 ﾠexample	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCharmides)	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠepithumia,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠ
consideration.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Though	 ﾠLysis	 ﾠ221b7-ﾭ‐8,	 ﾠa	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠcite	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠon	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ52,	 ﾠ
makes	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreading	 ﾠdifficult:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“And	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠand	 ﾠlove	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠpassionately	 ﾠ
(epithumounta	 ﾠkai	 ﾠerônta)	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠfriendly	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠit?”	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘kai’	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠepexegetic,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
appears,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠto	 ﾠlove	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠthing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘kai’	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠepexegetic,	 ﾠit	 ﾠremains	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠerôs	 ﾠcould	 ﾠhere	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠepithumia.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLysis,	 ﾠ
see	 ﾠPenner	 ﾠand	 ﾠRowe	 ﾠ(2005)	 ﾠ325,	 ﾠn.65	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpassages	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcite	 ﾠthere.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠany	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
discussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠCharmides	 ﾠ167e	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfrustrating	 ﾠomission.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠaccount,	 ﾠin	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠ2	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠcall	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠpassages	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠof	 ﾠexcessively	 ﾠfilling	 ﾠup	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠGorgias	 ﾠ505a6-ﾭ‐10),	 ﾠto	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠ
displaying	 ﾠcourage	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠLaches	 ﾠ191e4-ﾭ‐7),	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠwarn	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠacting	 ﾠbadly	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠof	 ﾠanger,	 ﾠfear,	 ﾠshame,	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpassions	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠApology	 ﾠ21b1-ﾭ‐23e3,	 ﾠ29e3-ﾭ‐30a3,	 ﾠ32b1-ﾭ‐d4,	 ﾠ
34b6-ﾭ‐d1).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrational	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠalone	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtexts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
my	 ﾠattention.6	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠmany	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpassages	 ﾠto	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
desiring	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠone	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbad,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠ
interpretation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠan	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠreading	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠProtagoras	 ﾠallow	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠfor	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIdeally,	 ﾠ
Brickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠinterpretations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠview.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠenough	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠreading	 ﾠis	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtext,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠto	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuperior	 ﾠto	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠinterpretations	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠpassages	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠbut	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
allows	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠinterpretation,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠpower	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
cohesion,	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠoff	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ
sense	 ﾠof	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠ77b6-ﾭ‐78c2,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠargument	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠmake	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠusing	 ﾠProtagoras	 ﾠ352b1-ﾭ‐358d4	 ﾠfails.7	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠbest,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠ
supports	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠover	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith’s	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠ
intellectualist	 ﾠaccount,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProtagoras	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ
account.	 ﾠ	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpassages	 ﾠfor	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠSocrates’	 ﾠ
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6	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeno,	 ﾠsee,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠin	 ﾠScott	 ﾠ(2005),	 ﾠ46-ﾭ‐53	 ﾠand	 ﾠ219-ﾭ‐21.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProtagoras,	 ﾠ
see,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠin	 ﾠReshotko	 ﾠ(2006),	 ﾠch.	 ﾠ4.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
keeping	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠScott	 ﾠand	 ﾠReshotko.	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠthese	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠin	 ﾠJones	 ﾠ(2011),	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠwelcome	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
opportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠthem	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Commentators	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠread	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠ77b6-ﾭ‐78c2	 ﾠas	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠ
thinks	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠever	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠrecognizes	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbad.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠdefines	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
desiring	 ﾠ(epithumounta)	 ﾠfine	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ[=	 ﾠgood	 ﾠthings]	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ
(77b4-ﾭ‐5).8	 ﾠ	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠtarget	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠconjunct,	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠfine	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠit,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠit	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠserve	 ﾠan	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefinition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠInitially,	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠthinks	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠdo	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ
conjunct,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhe	 ﾠthinks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
passage,	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠagrees	 ﾠthat	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠ(boulesthai)	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ(78a8-ﾭ‐b2).	 ﾠ	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠallow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠbad	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠmistaken	 ﾠit	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠgood,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠrecognizes	 ﾠas	 ﾠbad.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
So,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
thus	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith’s	 ﾠaccount.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Brickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠan	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠreading	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
leave	 ﾠopen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠone	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbad.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshift	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ‘epithumein’	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠthey	 ﾠassociate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠdesire)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ‘boulesthai’	 ﾠ
(which	 ﾠthey	 ﾠassociate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrational	 ﾠdesire)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠpart	 ﾠway	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
argument,	 ﾠand	 ﾠread	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtargeting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠis	 ﾠtargeting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠrational	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠleaving	 ﾠopen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings.	 ﾠ
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8	 ﾠ‘Fine	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ(tôn	 ﾠkalôn)’	 ﾠis	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠ‘good	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ(tôn	 ﾠagathôn)’,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
evidenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠMeno’s	 ﾠaffirmative	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠSocrates’	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠquestion:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“Do	 ﾠyou	 ﾠmean	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠman	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠbeautiful	 ﾠthings	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠgood	 ﾠthings?”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ There	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠinterpretation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSocrates’	 ﾠinterlocutors	 ﾠmust	 ﾠfully	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠevery	 ﾠstep	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
elenchos	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠon	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠseem	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠsome	 ﾠgrasp	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠmoves.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠread	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠas	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
grasp	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠmove,	 ﾠon	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith’s	 ﾠinterpretation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠ
(77b4-ﾭ‐5)	 ﾠdefines	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠas	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠ(epithumounta)	 ﾠfine	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ(tôn	 ﾠkalôn)	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ
able	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ(dunaton	 ﾠeinai	 ﾠporizesthai).	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument,	 ﾠ
Socrates	 ﾠrestates	 ﾠMeno’s	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠ(78b3-ﾭ‐4;	 ﾠmy	 ﾠtrans.):	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“Didn’t	 ﾠyou	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ
now	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ(boulesthai)	 ﾠgood	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ(t’agatha)	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
acquire	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ(dunasthai)?”	 ﾠ	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠagrees	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsaid.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠnone	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠelements	 ﾠ–	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠfine	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠor	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠpreserved	 ﾠ
precisely	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠdefinition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠpart	 ﾠis	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠon	 ﾠany	 ﾠview:	 ﾠ
‘dunasthai’	 ﾠat	 ﾠ78b4	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠelliptical	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠthing	 ﾠas	 ﾠ‘dunaton	 ﾠeinai	 ﾠ
porizesthai’	 ﾠat	 ﾠ77b4-ﾭ‐5.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠpart	 ﾠis	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠon	 ﾠany	 ﾠview:	 ﾠ	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠ77b6-ﾭ‐7	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠ(epithumounta)	 ﾠfine	 ﾠthings	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠgood	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshift	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfine	 ﾠthings	 ﾠat	 ﾠ77b4	 ﾠto	 ﾠgood	 ﾠthings	 ﾠat	 ﾠ78b4	 ﾠis	 ﾠunproblematic.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠis	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshift	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ‘epithumein’ to	 ﾠ‘boulesthai’.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠterms	 ﾠare	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠused	 ﾠequivalently,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikewise	 ﾠno	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠso	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠand	 ﾠMeno’s	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformulation	 ﾠat	 ﾠ78b3-ﾭ‐4	 ﾠexpresses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠthing	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformulation	 ﾠat	 ﾠ77b4-ﾭ‐5	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsuppose,	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠkey	 ﾠmove	 ﾠ–	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkey	 ﾠmove	 ﾠ–	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
intervening	 ﾠargument	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠlicenses	 ﾠreplacing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠ(‘epithumein’)	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠ(‘boulesthai’).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 7	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 ﾠ Brickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith’s	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠadvisedly	 ﾠthroughout,	 ﾠcarefully	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠone	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
depending	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtalking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠrational	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠor	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠ
desire,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠnever	 ﾠmanages	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠwrite	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠ68-ﾭ‐9):	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ[Socrates]	 ﾠuses	 ﾠ“epithumein”	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠasking	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠanyone	 ﾠ
ever	 ﾠforms	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠknows	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠhe	 ﾠemploys	 ﾠ“boulesthai”	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠasking	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠanyone	 ﾠever	 ﾠforms	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠrational	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmiserable	 ﾠand	 ﾠunhappy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠmanages	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠintroduces	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
way.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstruing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument,	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠhad	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠmanaged	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠdesires,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
represented	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
attempted	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠnow	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwholly	 ﾠindefensible.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument,	 ﾠif	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠis	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠtrying	 ﾠto	 ﾠshoot	 ﾠdown	 ﾠMeno’s	 ﾠ
definition,	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠit	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠjust	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠat	 ﾠ75d1-ﾭ‐2,	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠhere	 ﾠsay:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠmy	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠ[here:	 ﾠargument];	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠwrong,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠyour	 ﾠ
job	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefute	 ﾠit”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠMeno,	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠrelying	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ‘epithumein’	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘boulesthai’,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
do	 ﾠso.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠI	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠto	 ﾠinsist	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSocrates’	 ﾠ
interlocutors	 ﾠmust	 ﾠfully	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠevery	 ﾠstep	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠelenchos	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠon	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠseem	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠgrasp	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠ
moves.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠconfirmed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquote	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ75d1-ﾭ‐2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresponse,	 ﾠ“I	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠmy	 ﾠargument;	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠwrong,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠyour	 ﾠjob	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefute	 ﾠit,”	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠeristic	 ﾠand	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠor	 ﾠas	 ﾠGrube	 ﾠtranslates:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“If	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
questioner	 ﾠwas	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠclever	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisputatious	 ﾠdebaters,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsay	 ﾠto	 ﾠhim:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ‘I	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠmy	 ﾠanswer;	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠyour	 ﾠjob	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefute	 ﾠit.’”	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠdiscussion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHe	 ﾠsays:	 ﾠ	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Then,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠfriends,	 ﾠas	 ﾠyou	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠare,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠwith	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
other,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmust	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgentle	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠproper	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
discussion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠthis	 ﾠI	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanswers	 ﾠmust	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠadmittedly	 ﾠknown	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestioner.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
terms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(75d2-ﾭ‐7)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠhim	 ﾠthen	 ﾠonly	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpages	 ﾠlater	 ﾠto	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe	 ﾠnever	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠ
explicit,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecognize,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠto	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
maintain	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdefinition,	 ﾠas	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠus	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠseems	 ﾠ
unlikely.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠpushes	 ﾠus	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompeting	 ﾠinterpretation,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠat	 ﾠplay	 ﾠthroughout,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠterms	 ﾠare	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
express	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ There	 ﾠremains	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsingle-ﾭ‐desire	 ﾠreading,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠat	 ﾠ78a4-ﾭ‐8:	 ﾠ
Does	 ﾠanyone	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ(bouletai)	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmiserable	 ﾠand	 ﾠunhappy?	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠdoesn’t	 ﾠseem	 ﾠso	 ﾠto	 ﾠme,	 ﾠSocrates.	 ﾠ
Then	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠ(bouletai)	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠMeno,	 ﾠif	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠ
(bouletai)	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmiserable	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ
(epithumein)	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠ(ktasthai)	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings?9	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠplain	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠnearly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠbreath,	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠconcludes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠ(bouletai)	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠand	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
someone	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ(epithumein)	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnonsense	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠat	 ﾠplay.	 ﾠ	 ﾠScore	 ﾠone	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠinterpretation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Now	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠstalemate	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠtextual	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠside	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠHere	 ﾠI	 ﾠdepart	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠGrube’s	 ﾠtranslation,	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠto	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠ
‘bouletai’	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘epithumein’	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsynonymous.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠalso	 ﾠdepart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠGrube	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupplying	 ﾠ‘no	 ﾠone’	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘bouletai’	 ﾠ(borrowing	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠword	 ﾠand	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
previous	 ﾠclause,	 ﾠ‘oudeis’),	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ‘he’.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠtranslation	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠfits	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinferential	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpassage:	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmiserable	 ﾠand	 ﾠunhappy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠjust	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠestablished,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠis	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠaccepts,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
desires	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwould	 ﾠcontend	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠgood	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Grube’s	 ﾠtranslation,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠGrube’s	 ﾠtranslation	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠ
quite	 ﾠas	 ﾠplain.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ
stalemate	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠenough	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠneutralized	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpassages	 ﾠoften	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount,	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠ
sense	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠto	 ﾠresolve	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdifficulty.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNotice	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinferential	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
passage.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠhas	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbad	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠharm	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpossessor,	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠharmed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ(we	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
add:	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings);	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠharmed	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠextent	 ﾠ
miserable	 ﾠand	 ﾠunhappy;	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmiserable	 ﾠand	 ﾠunhappy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Socrates	 ﾠthen	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠ“No	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠif	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
supposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcome	 ﾠbefore.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
supposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠfollow?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIs	 ﾠit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconditional	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmiserable	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠunhappy,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings?	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠI	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠthat	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings.10	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ‘if	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch’	 ﾠreiterates	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠprior,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
miserable	 ﾠand	 ﾠunhappy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠinferential	 ﾠrole.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ‘for’	 ﾠclause	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ“For	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmiserable	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠbad	 ﾠ
things?”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠalso	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠinferential	 ﾠsupport.11	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠI	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjust	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘if	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch’,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠadd	 ﾠany	 ﾠnew	 ﾠcontent,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠreiterates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
argument.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSince	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmiserable	 ﾠjust	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠharmed	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠone	 ﾠis	 ﾠmiserable,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsince	 ﾠharm	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠacquiring	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsince	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
very	 ﾠfacts,	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠbad.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠSo	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠMeno.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHis	 ﾠnext	 ﾠline	 ﾠis:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“You	 ﾠare	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠright,	 ﾠSocrates,	 ﾠand	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠ(boulesthai)	 ﾠ
bad	 ﾠthings.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(78a8-ﾭ‐b2;	 ﾠGrube	 ﾠtrans.,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmodifications)	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthere	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠassertion	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ(subject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠqualification	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠ
paragraph):	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmiserable	 ﾠis	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠstill	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexplained	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠ“For	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
miserable	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings?”	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsimply,	 ﾠ“For	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmiserable	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings?”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠremind	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
chain	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠthat	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠendorsed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
desire	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings	 ﾠharm	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpossessor,	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠbe	 ﾠharmed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthem	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠshort	 ﾠstep	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠbad.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ‘for	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
miserable	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings?’	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠreminds	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠgot	 ﾠ
them	 ﾠstarted	 ﾠdown	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpath,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘if	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch’	 ﾠreminds	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠprior	 ﾠinference.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠhad	 ﾠsaid,	 ﾠ“For	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠyou	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdefending,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmiserable	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠbad	 ﾠ
things?”	 ﾠ	 ﾠTogether	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠbad,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ
claims	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ‘if	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch’	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘what	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmiserable	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings?’	 ﾠ–	 ﾠrecall	 ﾠin	 ﾠchiastic	 ﾠorder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠchain	 ﾠof	 ﾠinferences,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Meno	 ﾠis	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠadmit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhis	 ﾠposition	 ﾠwas	 ﾠuntenable:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“You	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
truth,	 ﾠSocrates,	 ﾠand	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘epithumein’	 ﾠin	 ﾠ‘what	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmiserable	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthings?’	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠadd	 ﾠanything	 ﾠnew,	 ﾠ
Meno	 ﾠand	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠsay	 ﾠno	 ﾠmore	 ﾠabout	 ﾠit	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠboth	 ﾠquick	 ﾠto	 ﾠmove	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠMeno’s	 ﾠ
original	 ﾠdefinition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAgain,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘epithumein’	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠadd	 ﾠanything	 ﾠnew,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠand	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠto	 ﾠworry	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterminological	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠrecalled.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ So,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠare	 ﾠwe?	 ﾠ	 ﾠEarlier	 ﾠI	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhad	 ﾠan	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠstalemate	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsingle-ﾭ‐desire	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ
interpretation:	 ﾠ	 ﾠEach	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠa	 ﾠtextual	 ﾠdifficulty.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThen	 ﾠI	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠa	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠway	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsingle-ﾭ‐desire	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠto	 ﾠbreak	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstalemate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠresult	 ﾠholds	 ﾠup,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
poses	 ﾠa	 ﾠserious	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠview,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Socrates	 ﾠhas	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠhe	 ﾠuses	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠterms	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠdesire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Protagoras	 ﾠ352b-ﾭ‐358d	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠother	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠis	 ﾠProtagoras	 ﾠ352b-ﾭ‐358d,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamous	 ﾠ
passage	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠappearance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHere	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠless	 ﾠtextually	 ﾠ
focused,	 ﾠand	 ﾠzero	 ﾠin	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠexample	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠuse	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
differentiate	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠand	 ﾠbolster	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcase	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠintellectualist	 ﾠ
interpretations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexample	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthreaten	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ
interpretation.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProtagoras,	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠargues	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmany	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
knowledge	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ“dragged	 ﾠabout	 ﾠlike	 ﾠa	 ﾠslave”	 ﾠby	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠanger,	 ﾠpleasure,	 ﾠpain,	 ﾠlove,	 ﾠ
fear,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠexplains	 ﾠSocrates’	 ﾠposition	 ﾠby	 ﾠnoting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠ
implies	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmaintaining	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠthinks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ(at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
desires	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmotivational	 ﾠforce),	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction	 ﾠare	 ﾠalways	 ﾠin	 ﾠharmony.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSince	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ
follows	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠever	 ﾠacts	 ﾠcontrary	 ﾠto	 ﾠher	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠever	 ﾠacts	 ﾠcontrary	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠher	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠabout	 ﾠher	 ﾠbest	 ﾠinterest.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAgainst	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠargue	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠagency	 ﾠof	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠappetites	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
interpret	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProtagoras	 ﾠproperly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠagency	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠgives	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠappearance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠobject	 ﾠto	 ﾠappear	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠagent	 ﾠthan	 ﾠit	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
really	 ﾠis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpower,	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠappearance	 ﾠoften	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠus	 ﾠ
wander	 ﾠall	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplace	 ﾠin	 ﾠconfusion,	 ﾠoften	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠand	 ﾠregretting	 ﾠour	 ﾠactions	 ﾠand	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthings	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠand	 ﾠsmall”	 ﾠ
(356d4-ﾭ‐7).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠinterpret	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠ71):	 ﾠ
Socrates	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠthat	 ﾠappetites	 ﾠand	 ﾠpassions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeither	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠor	 ﾠweak	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠappetite	 ﾠor	 ﾠpassion	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠcause	 ﾠan	 ﾠunknowing	 ﾠ
agent	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpleasure	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠaims	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
appetite	 ﾠor	 ﾠpassion,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobject	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappetite	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
passion	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠappearance	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappetite,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠ“convincing”	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpower	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠargument	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
treating	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠhunger	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠas	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ
perceptions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmany	 ﾠthink	 ﾠ–	 ﾠto	 ﾠanticipate	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠexample	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Smith	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠat	 ﾠt1	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchocolate	 ﾠtart	 ﾠin	 ﾠfront	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠhim	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠbest	 ﾠinterest,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthen	 ﾠeats	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart	 ﾠat	 ﾠt2,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ(at	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases)	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠby	 ﾠpleasure	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠt1	 ﾠand	 ﾠt2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ
interpretation	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠredescribing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠas	 ﾠone	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart-ﾭ‐eater	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
gained	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpiece	 ﾠof	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠt1	 ﾠand	 ﾠt2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠnew	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
agent	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnew	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠgoodness	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠin,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhis	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠdesires.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠmisses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
challenge	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcompletely,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠwould	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
being	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠby	 ﾠpleasure	 ﾠif	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmind	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
information.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠhere	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠexplains	 ﾠhow	 ﾠan	 ﾠobject,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtart,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠchange	 ﾠ(not	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠspatial	 ﾠor	 ﾠtemporal	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
agent),	 ﾠacquires	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠappear	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠat	 ﾠt2	 ﾠthan	 ﾠit	 ﾠdid	 ﾠat	 ﾠt1.	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Consider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠexample	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠgive	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart-ﾭ‐eater	 ﾠ
(76-ﾭ‐9).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprotagonist,	 ﾠP,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠjust	 ﾠfinished	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠand	 ﾠsatisfying	 ﾠmeal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
chocolate	 ﾠtart	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdessert,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhost	 ﾠplaces	 ﾠa	 ﾠpiece	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠin	 ﾠfront	 ﾠof	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
thoroughly	 ﾠsated,	 ﾠthough,	 ﾠand	 ﾠrecalling	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdoctor’s	 ﾠadvice	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠrich	 ﾠfoods,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
declines	 ﾠto	 ﾠeat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart	 ﾠand	 ﾠtells	 ﾠhis	 ﾠhost	 ﾠhe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdoctor’s	 ﾠadvice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠ
Brickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠit,	 ﾠ“P	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠat	 ﾠt1	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpleasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
eating	 ﾠ[the	 ﾠtart]	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠworth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠevil	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsuffer”	 ﾠ(77).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhost	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtart	 ﾠin	 ﾠfront	 ﾠof	 ﾠP	 ﾠand,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠminutes	 ﾠduring	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠP	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdigested	 ﾠenough	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠsated,	 ﾠat	 ﾠt2	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfind	 ﾠP	 ﾠdevouring	 ﾠevery	 ﾠlast	 ﾠ
crumb	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart.	 ﾠ	 ﾠApparently,	 ﾠP	 ﾠnow	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpleasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠeating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
worth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdoctor	 ﾠhas	 ﾠwarned	 ﾠhim	 ﾠabout.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Brickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgives	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
appearance	 ﾠat	 ﾠt2	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠlacked	 ﾠat	 ﾠt1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠ
cannot	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠP’s	 ﾠappetite,	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠallegedly	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠaccommodate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠInstead,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbook,	 ﾠone	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠactions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠglutton	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
allowed	 ﾠhis	 ﾠappetites	 ﾠfree	 ﾠrein.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBetween	 ﾠt1	 ﾠand	 ﾠt2,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠappetite	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrich	 ﾠsweets,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠtemporarily	 ﾠsated	 ﾠby	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmeal,	 ﾠregains	 ﾠstrength.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠappetite	 ﾠthen	 ﾠ
confers	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠappearance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠthan	 ﾠit	 ﾠis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnewly	 ﾠconferred	 ﾠpower,	 ﾠP’s	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠeating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠhis	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠbest	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠchanges.	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 ﾠ I	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠis	 ﾠthreatened	 ﾠby	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠchange:	 ﾠ	 ﾠanything	 ﾠintrinsic	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
apparent	 ﾠsize	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠavailability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠto	 ﾠP’s	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠeating	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtart,	 ﾠand	 ﾠP’s	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠto	 ﾠP’s	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠeating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
indeed	 ﾠP’s	 ﾠappetite	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠchanged:	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠgone	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠsated	 ﾠto	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠsatiety.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠpiece	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsort	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaccommodated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠinterpretation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
available	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠperceiver.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐personally	 ﾠto	 ﾠanyone	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
circumstances	 ﾠlike	 ﾠP’s,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠtemperate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesserts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshould	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠour	 ﾠpleasure	 ﾠcalculus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpleasant	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠeat	 ﾠtarts	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠyou	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstuffed	 ﾠthan	 ﾠto	 ﾠeat	 ﾠthem	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠyou	 ﾠare	 ﾠstuffed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
discomforts	 ﾠof	 ﾠtart	 ﾠeating	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠstuffed	 ﾠare	 ﾠfairly	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠ(unlike,	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
discomforts	 ﾠof	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcholesterol	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtart-ﾭ‐eating,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠfairly	 ﾠdistant),	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpleasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠeating	 ﾠis	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠpleasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtongue	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpleasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠeating	 ﾠderives	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtaste,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfood	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠyou	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠcomfortably	 ﾠ(rather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
uncomfortably)	 ﾠfull.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠcan	 ﾠallow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠappetite,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠchange	 ﾠconstitutes	 ﾠnew	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnew	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠP	 ﾠrecalculates	 ﾠand	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmind	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠeating	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtart	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠbest	 ﾠinterest,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠchange	 ﾠof	 ﾠmind	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠP	 ﾠeating	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtart.12	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthreaten	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcase	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcasts	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠI	 ﾠsketched	 ﾠinitially,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠhad	 ﾠit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠlacks	 ﾠresources	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠhow	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
object	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠchange	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠacquires	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠappear	 ﾠ
better	 ﾠat	 ﾠt2	 ﾠthan	 ﾠit	 ﾠdid	 ﾠat	 ﾠt1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠStrictly	 ﾠspeaking,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpower;	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
had	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠdistorted	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠall	 ﾠalong,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠpleasures	 ﾠ
being	 ﾠso	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠnearer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagent	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpains	 ﾠof	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcholesterol.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsoon	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcalculus	 ﾠhad	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagent	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
incorrectly	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorrectly	 ﾠweigh	 ﾠnearby	 ﾠpleasures	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠfar	 ﾠaway	 ﾠ
pains	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠeat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
many	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhappy	 ﾠto	 ﾠcall	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠby	 ﾠpleasure.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠby	 ﾠpleasure	 ﾠis	 ﾠanother	 ﾠ
matter	 ﾠaltogether.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠI	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠdefenders	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
concede	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠhandle	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdone	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠtext	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠProtagoras.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠshown	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠview	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠadmit	 ﾠdefeat	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠProtagoras-ﾭ‐inspired	 ﾠexample	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtart-ﾭ‐eater.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCoupled	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
argument	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠSocratic	 ﾠintellectualism	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhandle	 ﾠMeno	 ﾠ
77b6-ﾭ‐78c2	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠthan	 ﾠBrickhouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠSmith’s	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠintellectualist	 ﾠaccount,	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠI	 ﾠgive	 ﾠsubstantially	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠin	 ﾠJones	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠ150.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 16	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsome	 ﾠway	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠshowing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠremains	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
viable	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠof	 ﾠSocrates.13	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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